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Abstract  
 
We examine the impact of executive pay dispersion on firm performance and valuation in a global sample of 
banks.  Controlling for cultural differences across countries, we test whether the equity fairness (favouring 
smaller pay dispersion) or tournament theory (arguing for greater pay dispersion) are better descriptions of 
the relationship between pay dispersion and performance. We find that the equity fairness theory prevails in 
most sub-groups of our sample, with the exception of Common Law developed country banks.  We also find 
for our sample banks in Developed Countries that Individualism is positively associated with market 
valuation while Uncertainty Avoidance has a negative effect.  
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1. Introduction  
There has been a long-standing debate in the executive compensation literature as to whether higher or lower 
pay dispersion can enhance organizational performance.  In sport, previous studies obtain supporting 
evidence for the tournament theory and suggest that golfers’ performance improves as prized differentials 
increase.  For professional racing drivers, pay dispersion also has a positive impact on both individual 
performance and driver safety.  On the other hand, a baseball game relies on individual efforts as well as 
corporation between team members and is said to benefit from greater equity in pay.   
However, the issue of pay dispersion has not received much attention in the banking literature and the main 
contribution of our study is to fill this gap using a study with global scope.  In particular, we look at pay 
dispersion at the top executive level and test whether the tournament theory or the equity fairness theory is 
applicable to bank performance. The need for such research has gained in importance and urgency recently 
as compensation issues have figured quite prominently in larger discussions concerning the relationship 
between the effective corporate governance and bank performance.  Moreover, policymakers care about the 
design of executive pay at banks because the systemic importance of banks and the use of taxpayer money to 
rescue failing institutions distinguish them from non-financial corporations.  
Since we use international data to examine the extent to which executive pay dispersion affects bank 
performance and valuation, we wonder how this relationship may be affected by institutional, legal and 
other relevant structural differences across countries.  One contribution of the paper is to incorporate the 
notion that cultural factors may have an impact on how pay dispersion influences firm performance and 
valuation.  For example, the dysfunctional effect of pay dispersion on team performance may be stronger in 
cultures that are characterized as more collectivist.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we survey the separate literatures on pay 
dispersion and cultural differences in Finance research.  In Section 3, we describe our theoretical model.  In 
Section 4, we report the empirical results. We summarize and conclude in Section 5. 
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2.  Literature review  
2.1. Tournament vs. Equity Fairness Theory  
Prior research on compensation and performance first investigated chief executive pay, then expanding the 
scope to the compensation of the entire managerial team.  For example, Barron and Waddell (2003) found 
that higher rank managers have a greater proportion of incentive-based compensation in pay packages than 
do lower ranked executives.  Overall, the early literature into executive compensation has primarily focused 
on issues related to the level and structural mix of compensation packages, and their sensitivity to firm 
performance (e.g. Kale, Reis and Venkateswaran, 2009; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999).  However, studies 
on the impact of executive compensation in the financial and banking sector are scarce.  One exception is 
Becht, Bolton and Röell (2011) who suggest that more shareholder power can lead to more risk taking, 
therefore equity-based incentives for executives can lead to excessive risk taking.   
Tournament theory (Grund and Westergaard-Nielsen, 2008; Kale, Reis and Venkateswaran, 2009) predicts 
that compensation across managers will be more dispersed than under the equity fairness theory. The 
tournament theory is also known as the hierarchical pay hypothesis in the literature.  It was first developed 
by Lazear and Rosen (1981) who contend that compensation spreads are not based on marginal productivity, 
but rather on relative differences between the individuals.  In the presence of a tight positive relationship 
between employee effort and output, efficiency can be secured by the widening of pay dispersion across the 
corporate hierarchy towards top positions. Good examples of the applicability of the tournament theory can 
be found in professional sports.   
The theory of equity fairness (Wade, O’Reilly and Pollock, 2006) indicates that large pay dispersion can 
increase envy and dysfunctional behavior among team members.  This may give rise to negative effects of 
pay disparity on firm performance. According to Lazear (1989), wage dispersion does not only affect the 
final team output but also the way this output is produced.  Members of high-inequality teams behave less 
cooperatively and act more selfishly than members of teams with a compressed wage structure.  
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Comparative studies are relatively rarer. Beaumont and Harris (2003) investigate whether a hierarchical or 
compressed wage structure has a positive impact on organizational performance by employing UK 
manufacturing micro-data in five industrial sectors.   
 
2.2. Cultural differences 
We include Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) cultural dimensions as control variables when exploring the impact of 
pay dispersion on bank performance. While the inclusion of cultural dimensions is common in the business 
and management literature, cultural variables have only recently gained acceptance in the finance literature 
(Aggarwal and Goodell 2014). In an early contribution to the literature, Stulz and Williamson (2003) find 
that cultural variations, proxied by differences in religion and language, can help to explain how investor 
protection diverges across countries.  Aggarwal, Kearny and Lucey (2012) incorporate Hofstede’s cultural 
variables in gravity models of foreign portfolio investment (FPI).  Studies on the impact of culture on asset 
prices have emerged, following the research by Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) who detect a significant 
relationship between the cultural dimension of Individualism and stock market momentum. Beugelsdijk and 
Frijns (2010) examine the influence of culture and cultural distance on international asset allocation. 
Anderson et al (2011) also investigate the effect of culture on international diversification in institutionally 
managed portfolios.  These studies suggest that culture may be an important omitted variable in cross-
country asset pricing studies. Research on the impact of culture on pay has been even rarer and, to our 
knowledge, our paper is the first to examine the influence of culture and pay dispersion on performance and 
valuation of banks. 
3. Theoretical model 
Since theory does not provide strong arguments in favor of the equity fairness or the tournament theory, the 
nature of the relationship between executive pay dispersion and bank performance remains an empirical 
question.  Our theoretical model has been inspired by the following two studies: (1) a translog profit 
function introduced by Mullineaux (1978) which is used to estimate economies of scale and efficiency (2) a 
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pay-dispersion model proposed by Franck and Nüesch (2011), which focuses on the impact of intra-team 
pay dispersion on German soccer team productivity.  By modifying and combining these two models, we are 
able to address the potential problems of relying on reduced-form estimation.  
3.1 Modeling bank performance   
In our opinion, the unique nature of the banking industry, i.e. the combination of labor, interest and capital 
to produce banking services, is captured more fully by incorporating the characteristics of the translog profit 
function rather than a reduced form model.  One of the most widely used flexible functional forms for a 
profit function is the transcendental logarithmic function form since this form is easily adaptable to include 
multiple banking outputs and multiple banking inputs. A typical full translog profit function (Mullineaux, 
1978) in “output prices”, “prices of variable inputs” and “quantities of the fixed factors” can be expressed as 
follows: 
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 (1) 
where: 
profit  is defined as total revenue minus the cost of the variable factors of production, 
output are the m  bank output prices,  
input are the prices of the n  variable inputs, 
and fixedfactor  are the  p quantities of the fixed factors of production.  
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The theory of the translog profit function provides us with a solid background to explain why output prices, 
prices of variable inputs and quantities of fixed factors can serve as control variables for our model of 
executive pay dispersion and bank performance.  
3.2 Modelling pay dispersion 
The existing literature largely concentrates on linear effects (Hibbs and Locking, 2000), while Grund and 
Westergaard- Nielsen (2008) and Franck and Nüesch (2011) propose that the relationship between intra-
team wage differentials and team performance is less likely to be linear under the two competing paradigms 
discussed earlier – the tournament theory and the equity fairness theory.  To allow for potential non-linearity 
in our study, we include a linear term of paydisp  and the quadratic term 
2paydisp  into our theoretical 
model.  Since Franck and Nüesch (2011) indicate that the Gini coefficient and the coefficient of variation 
(CV) are strongly correlated, we adopt the coefficient of variation (CV) of total compensation as our only 
indicator of the variable of pay dispersion in this study.  The coefficient of variation (CV) is a normalized 
measure of dispersion of a probability distribution and is computed as the ratio of the standard deviation to 
the mean.  
3.3 Combined model and variable definitions 
Our main model is in equation (2), which is based on the combination of a pay dispersion model and a 
modified translog profit function applied to the banking industry.  In addition to our original performance 
indicator, the variable of “Profit”, we also investigate two further performance measures that relate to the 
market’s valuation of banks, Tobin’s Q and Price-to-Book (P/B) ratios.  If compensation includes stock 
options, executives may target market valuations and share prices rather than operational performance 
measures such as profit.  In equation (2), we also control for the impact from different bank regulatory 
systems, capital adequacy, and corporate governance variables while we investigate the relationship between 
the variable of pay dispersion at the top executive level and these indicators of bank performances.  Overall, 
there are 4 categories of variables in our major equation: (a) banking firms’ performance indicators, (b) 
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banking firms’ inputs (c) banking firms’ outputs and (d) control variables with regards to the different 
regulatory systems, capital adequacy and corporate governance.   
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                                                                                                                                                 (2)                                                                                                                                             
where the control variables jcontrol  are the dummy variables for widely owned and CEO duality, the 
variable of capital adequacy, the variable of default risk, and dummy for development status, respectively.  
Bank Performance Indicators 
Undoubtedly, bank profit should be chosen as one of our performance indicators.  However, more than one 
proxy for bank performance was adopted since we would also like to examine whether pay dispersion is 
reflected in the way that the stock market values banks. Therefore, the profit indicator is employed as the 
measure representing operational performance, while Tobin’s Q and the P/B ratio (Caprio, Laeven and 
Levine, 2007) are also adopted as indicators of the market valuation of our sample banks.   
Banking Firms’ Inputs 
For estimating the prices of banking firms’ inputs, we include interest price and labor price as the two input 
variables, which are also commonly viewed as key inputs in the banking literature on the translog profit 
function and translog cost function (Yu and Luu, 2003).   
Banking Firms’ Outputs 
We consider that the modern banking industry has more diversified businesses rather than simply operating 
on the traditional banking loan business. In contrast to previous studies in banking (Berger, Hancock and 
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Humphrey, 1993), which mainly use loan rates, the variable of output is defined by us as the sum of interest 
income and investment income divided by total earning assets.   
  
Other Control Variables  
1) Corporate governance variables 
In our view, corporate governance structures are likely to affect the association between firm performance 
and pay dispersion. We therefore include the following two variables: “controlling ownership” and “CEO 
duality”. 
i. Controlling ownership 
We classify a bank as having a controlling owner if the shareholder has voting rights that sum to 10% or 
more, otherwise, we classify the banks as widely held.  In previous research, it was argued that 10% voting 
rights are frequently sufficient to exert control (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002; Yu and Luu, 
2015). We observe in our sub-sample of banks from Developing Countries that banks are not generally 
widely-held. 
ii. CEO duality:  
We include this variable into our major equation for examining whether the combined roles of the CEO and 
board chairman in the same person could affect the association between firm performance and pay 
dispersion.  
2) Size 
In order to control for additional bank-specific characteristics, we include the logarithm of each bank’s total 
assets as the indicator of the size factor since “bank size” may influence valuations (Caprio, Laeven and 
Levine, 2007; Yu and Luu, 2003).  The size of the bank firm has been adopted as our fixed factor. The 
quantity of fixed inputs cannot be changed during the production period.  
3) Capital Adequacy   
Tier 1 Capital is included in our model as one of our control variables to control for the impact from 
different regulatory restrictions on banks.  Although most countries have indicated their intention to adopt 
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the much more detailed set of recommendations contained in Basel II and III, not all of our sample countries 
adopted the Basel Committee’s original recommendations on capital regulations and official supervision. 
Differences in Tier 1 capital ratios across these sample banks may also be a reflection of differences in 
regulatory restrictions on banks across countries.   
4) Legal origins 
Many studies investigate effects of law and regulations for corporations.  In order to investigate the impact 
from different regulatory systems, we classify our sub-sample banks from developed - OECD countries 
according to the origin of their legal systems into Common Law and Civil Law countries.   
3.4 Cultural dimensions  
Some theories of pay determination, e.g. the efficiency wage theory, postulate that compensation is not 
driven only by economic motives and notions of fairness can have a bearing on organizational behavior. It is 
a natural extension of this idea to ask whether cultural divergences have a bearing on how pay and pay 
dispersion impacts on firm performance. According to Hofstede (2010), “culture” is like the collective 
programming of the mind distinguishing the members of one group of people from others. The values that 
distinguish country cultures from each other can be statistically categorized into four groups, which we use 
to control for the cross-country cultural differences between the 20 countries in our sample3. These four 
dimensions are:  (a) Power Distance (PDI), (b) Individualism (IDV), (c) Masculinity (MAS) and (d) 
Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI). The values range from 0 to 100. 
                                                 
3 The measurement of culture is based on comprehensive studies by Hofstede on how values in the workplace are influenced by 
culture among IBM employees, starting in the late 1960’s. Subsequent studies validating the earlier results include such 
respondent groups as commercial airline pilots and students in 23 countries, civil service managers in 14 counties, 'up-market' 
consumers in 15 countries and 'elites' in 19 countries. In the 2010 edition of the book “Cultures and Organizations: Software of the 
Mind”, scores on the dimensions are listed for 76 countries, partly based on replications and extensions of the IBM study on 
different international populations and by different scholars. We use these values for our study. 
12 
 
The dimension of Power Distance measures the degree to which the less powerful members of a society 
accept the fact that power is distributed unequally. Inhabitants of countries with high values of power 
distance accept a hierarchical order in which individuals have their place and they do not need further 
justification for this hierarchy. In societies with low power distance, people aim to equalize the distribution 
of power and demand rationalization for inequalities of power. Individualism quantifies the degree of 
interdependence a society maintains among its members. In highly individualist societies, people look after 
themselves and their immediate family only, whereas people belong to larger groups that take care of them 
in exchange for loyalty in collectivist societies. A high value on the Masculinity dimension indicates that a 
society values competition, achievement and success. A low score on the dimension (describing a society 
which is characterized as feminine) suggests that compassion for others and the quality of life are more 
important than winning and standing out.  Finally, Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) appraises the way that a 
society deals with the ambiguities of an uncertain future. In countries with a high score for UAI, people feel 
threatened by uncertainty and have created mechanisms for avoiding these ambiguous or unknown 
situations.  
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4. Data and empirical results 
In this section, we report and interpret our empirical results. 
4.1. Data sources  
The greatest challenge, and one of the contributions of the paper, is to generate the data of executive pay 
dispersion for 92 sample banks worldwide.  The sample banks from our first sub-group have been chosen 
from the top 500 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) banks by asset size.  
Banks were included in the study only if their relevant executive remuneration data was available from 
annual reports or Thomson One databases so we are able to generate the executive pay dispersion data for 
each sample bank.  Finally, based on the annual compensation dataset, we generate the pay dispersion 
variable for each sample bank in each sample year by computing the mean and standard deviation of the 
compensation of the top 3-5 executives.  In this study, we use actual compensation to determine pay 
dispersion and we define “the total annual compensation” for each managerial team member as the total cash 
value of all pay components in that sample year, including salary, cash bonus, equity options and other 
compensations.  The following table (see Table 1) reports the average executive pay dispersion for each of 
our sub-sample banks.  We compute the mean and standard deviation of the compensation of the top 3-5 
executives in each of our sample banks.  Our mean dispersion (coefficient of variation) of management 
compensation is 0.3977 with an interquartile range of 0.2839, suggesting considerable smaller sample cross-
sectional variability of pay dispersion compared with the previous literature.  We find that the estimated 
average executive pay dispersions in Common Law and Civil Law are significantly higher than those in 
Developing countries.  Moreover, among our five groups, banks from Common Law countries have the 
highest average executive pay dispersion.  
Table 1 Executive pay dispersion of our five groups 
Our sub-sample banks Worldwide 
92 banks 
Developed 
63 banks 
Developing 
29 banks 
Common Law 
27 banks 
Civil Law 
36 banks 
Executive Pay Dispersion 
 
0.3977 
(0.2839) 
0.4673 
(0.2723) 
0.2515 
(0.2509) 
0.5016 
(0.2440) 
0.4274 
(0.2978) 
We summarize our estimation methods for each variable and their definition in Table 2.  
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Table 2 Definitions of variables in our model and their estimation methods 
Variable Definition 
Pay dispersion indicators   
(paydisp) In this study, we adopt the coefficient of variation (CV) as the indicator of the pay dispersion. 
(paydisp)
2
 
The coefficient of variation (CV) squared has also been included. 
Banking firms’ performance indicators   
Total profit 
 
The variable of profit is defined as total revenue minus the cost of the variable factors of 
production. 
Pre-tax profit margin Pre-tax profit margin = [Pretax Income (Losses)]  / (Net Revenue)  
Return om Equity (ROE) ROE = (net income available for common shareholders) / (average total common equity) 
Tobin Q Tobin Q = (market capitalization + liabilities + preferred equity + minority interest) / (total 
assets) 
P/B ratio P/B ratio = (share price) / (book value per share) 
Output prices 
Output Output = (interest income) / (earning assets) 
More precise definition of our “Output” is as follows: Output = [(interest income) + 
(investment income)]  /  [(marketable securities)+(short term securities)+(total 
loans)+(interbank assets)+(long term investments and long-term receivables)]  
Input prices 
Labor price In this study, we define the factor of labor price as the average wage rate of bank officers. 
Labor input price = (personnel expense ) / (number of employees) 
Interest input price Interest price 
= (Interest expense) / (average interest bearing liabilities) 
Quantities of fixed factors  
Bank size The logarithm of each bank’s total assets 
 
 
Control variables 
Corporate governance factors Widely owned 
We define controlling ownership as being present when a shareholder owns more than 10%, 
otherwise the bank is widely owned. 
widely owned = 1,  
otherwise controlling ownership is present, not widely owned = 0 
CEO duality 
In this study, we assume that if CEO and Chairman are different=1, otherwise the same=0. 
Capital adequacy  Tier 1 capital ratio = Tier 1 capital / risk-weighted assets.  
Default risk Default risk = (Non-performing asset) / (total assets) 
Dummy variable for 
development status 
A group for Developed Countries = 1 
A group for Developing Countries =0 
 
The following table presents the descriptive statistics of all variables in this study. 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of all variables (Currency: US dollar) 
 Abbreviation 
of variable 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard 
deviation 
Bank asset size  
(measurement unit: million 
US dollars) 
Size 597572.2 290816.7 3649800 4136.773 724035.3 
Pre-tax profit Profit 4718.660 2200.030 48923.34 13.23800 6431.091 
Interest price (%) Interest 4.087504 3.689700 20.33500 0.589900 2.141603 
Default risk (%) Defaultr 1.912710 0.886850 34.82890 0.000000 3.186683 
Output Output 0.048843 0.044700 0.192053 0.007140 0.020660 
Capital adequacy - Tier 1 
capital ratio (%) 
Tier1 9.855876 9.310000 32.00000 -1.470000 3.118807 
Labor price Laborp 0.084283 0.073436 0.504750 0.005875 0.072025 
15 
 
ROE Roe 11.88407 14.12185 42.32480 -156.5255 14.27658 
Pretax profit margin (%) pretaxmargin 22.11411 28.11740 85.26910 -535.5368 40.55895 
Tobin Q Tobinq 1.030052 1.017750 1.619800 0.941800 0.061815 
P/B ratio Pb 1.549660 1.333900 8.127300 0.024800 1.065410 
Pay dispersion Paydisp 0.397701 0.345394 1.459283 0.000000 0.283854 
 
The following table lists the scores on the four different cultural dimensions for each sub-sample group.  
 
Table 4 Pay Dispersion vs Culture Dimensions for our five sub-sample banks 
Our sub-sample banks Worldwide 
92 banks 
Developed 
63 banks 
Developing 
29 banks 
Common Law 
27 banks 
Civil Law 
36 banks 
Individualism vs Collectivism  
 
(Hofstede’s Individualism index; 
score) 
61.6413 
(23.9453) 
75.0318 
(13.3617) 
32.5517 
(13.9516) 
84.9259 
(8.4454) 
67.6111 
(11.4250) 
Power Distance  
 
(Hofstede’s Power Distance index; 
score) 
54.1630 
(19.7682) 
42.8889 
(12.8845) 
78.6552 
(1.4948) 
37.4444 
(2.8647) 
46.9722 
(15.6758) 
Masculinity versus Femininity 
  
(Hofstede’s Masculinity index; score) 
55.1413 
(16.6106) 
52.2064 
(19.0883) 
61.5172 
(4.9827) 
60.0741 
(5.6417) 
49.5278 
(21.8058) 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index 
  
(Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance 
index; score) 
52.5109 
(19.8781) 
60.8095 
(18.6302) 
34.4828 
(4.9827) 
45.5926 
(5.3322) 
72.2222 
(16.7942) 
 
4.2. Econometric procedure  
We analyze our unbalanced panel data by employing the following econometric procedure.  Firstly, we 
examine our data using the likelihood ratio test. The null hypothesis of the likelihood ratio test is the 
intercepts are the same for each bank and for each year.  Secondly, we employ the Hausman test to decide 
whether the fixed effects model or random effects model suits our panel data better.  For the fixed effects 
model, it is possible to allow for both entity-fixed effects and time-fixed effects within the same model.  The 
random effects could be along either the cross-sectional or period dimensions.  However, since we have 
missing data in our dataset, we cannot have time variation and cross-section variation at the same time when 
the random effects model is employed in our study.   
4.3. Discussion of results  
We analyze our unbalanced panel data by employing the same econometric procedures described in 4.2. for 
each of our subsamples.  After estimating the pay-dispersion model represented in equation (2), we carry out 
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Wald tests on both coefficients of the linear and the quadratic term of the variable of executive pay 
dispersion.   
We start by pooling all of our sample banks, but do not report the results because the diagnostic results 
suggest that doing so does not produce an adequate model.  We find that the residuals of these global 
regressions are not normally distributed, even after adding cultural variables to equation (5) in order to 
control the cross-country difference.  Therefore, it is not appropriate to pool all of our sample banks.   
Instead, we divide our sample into further four smaller sub-samples: a group of Developing (29 banks in 
Developing Countries), a group of Developed (63 banks in Developed Countries), a group of Civil Law 
countries (36 banks) and a group of Common Law countries (27 banks) – see Appendix A (Table A1).   
We start by discussing the results for banks in the Developed Country subsample using Tobin’s Q (Table 5) 
and P/B (Table 6) as the dependent variable. We obtain reasonable adjusted 
2R  for these regressions 
ranging from 76.61% to 78.19%.  All of the residual distributions of these regressions for the three 
performance indicators are also normal, although the linear term and the quadratic terms of pay dispersion 
are only statistically significant for the two indicators of market valuation – the P/B ratio and the Tobin’s Q 
ratio, but not the log(Profit) variable. The coefficients of the pay dispersion variables are consistent across 
the cultural control variables used, i.e. negative for the linear and positive for the quadratic term. Both sets 
of empirical results for Tobin’s Q and the P/B ratio can be interpreted as supporting evidence of equity 
fairness, except for very high pay dispersion (U-shaped impact curve). The U-shaped relationship between 
the variable of pay dispersion and these two indicators of market valuation is depicted in Figure 2 and Figure 
3. For most values of pay dispersion, the impact is negative, supporting the equity fairness theory although 
the tournament theory is corroborated for extremely high pay dispersion. With regard to the cultural 
variables, we find that two of the four cultural dimensions have a significant on the performance indicators.  
Individualism is positively associated with P/B and Tobin’s Q while Uncertainty Avoidance has a negative 
relationship with the market valuation indicators.  
Table 5 Analyses on Tobin’s Q - “a group of Developed – 63 banks from Developed Countries” 
Performance indicators Tobin Q 
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   Individualism Power 
Distance 
Masculinity Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
 C   0.7883* 
(0.4001) 
0.7745* 
(0.4044) 
1.0238*** 
(0.3646) 
Pay dispersion -0.0690** 
(0.0290) 
-0.0903*** 
(0.0280) 
-0.0674** 
(0.0294) 
-0.0069** 
(0.0290) 
-0.0712** 
(0.0281) 
(Pay dispersion)
2
 
0.0630*** 
(0.0213) 
0.0752*** 
(0.0217) 
0.0615*** 
(0.0217) 
0.0630*** 
(0.0212) 
0.0619*** 
(0.0213) 
Cultural Index   Individualism 
 
0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
Power 
Distance 
-7.45E-05 
(0.0002) 
Masculinity 
 
-6.10E-05 
(0.000162 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
-0.0003*** 
(9.74E-05) 
 log(output)      
 log(interestp/100)      
 log(laborp)      
 log(size)      
 0.5*log(output)*log(output)      
 0.5*log(interestp/100)*log(interestp/100)      
 0.5*log(laborp)*log(laborp)      
 0.5*log(size)*log(size)      
 log(output)*log(interestp/100)  
 
-0.0317** 
(0.0159) 
   
 log(output)*log(laborp)      
 log(output)*log(size)      
 log(interestp/100)*log(laborp) 0.0329** 
(0.0153) 
0.0314** 
(0.0135) 
0.0317** 
(0.0157) 
0.0342** 
(0.0157) 
0.0304** 
(0.0147) 
 log(interestp/100)*log(size)      
 log(laborp)*log(size)      
 Widely-owned 0.0131*** 
(0.0044) 
0.0097** 
(0.0041) 
0.0133*** 
(0.0044) 
0.0130*** 
(0.0044) 
0.0123*** 
(0.0042) 
(defaultr/100) -0.7318*** 
(0.1899) 
-0.6692*** 
(0.1597) 
-0.7389*** 
(0.1942) 
-0.7377*** 
(0.1866) 
-0.7348*** 
(0.1706) 
(tier1/100)   0.2379* 
(0.1414) 
  
Adjusted
2R  0.7998 0.8125 0.7969 0.8004 0.8057 
 
Figure 1 - Developed Tobin Q
 
 
Table 6 Analyses on the P/B ratio - “a group of Developed – 63 banks from Developed Countries” 
group average = 
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0.5476
1.0952
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Performance indicators P/B ratio 
   Individualism Power 
Distance 
Masculinity Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
C    -25.3483 
(11.4150) 
 
Pay dispersion -0.9698* 
(0.5291) 
-1.1131* 
(0.5982) 
-0.2312 
(0.6362) 
-0.6505 
(0.6455) 
-0.5080 
(0.6048) 
(Pay dispersion)
2
 
0.8760** 
(0.3821) 
0.9342** 
(0.4601) 
0.3438 
(0.5068) 
0.6750 
(0.5276) 
0.5054 
(0.4662) 
Cultural Index   Individualism 
 
 
0.0202*** 
(0.0045) 
Power 
Distance 
 
-0.0117*** 
(0.0039) 
Masculinity 
 
 
0.0099* 
(0.0050) 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
 
-0.0115*** 
(0.0029) 
 log(output)      
 log(interestp/100)      
 log(laborp)      
 log(size)  3.2398*** 
(1.0881) 
2.9391*** 
(1.1071) 
4.4287*** 
(1.2149) 
2.6675** 
(1.1118) 
 0.5*log(output)*log(output)      
 0.5*log(interestp/100)*log(interestp/100)      
 0.5*log(laborp)*log(laborp) 1.1717** 
(0.5180) 
1.7250*** 
(0.5102) 
1.3285** 
(0.6327) 
1.2507** 
(0.6208) 
1.5605*** 
(0.5932) 
 0.5*log(size)*log(size) -0.0929* 
(0.0555) 
-0.1892*** 
(0.0711) 
-0.1848** 
(0.0740) 
-0.2702*** 
(0.0826) 
-0.1625** 
(0.0734) 
 log(output)*log(interestp/100)      
 log(output)*log(laborp)      
 log(output)*log(size)      
 log(interestp/100)*log(laborp)      
 log(interestp/100)*log(size)      
 log(laborp)*log(size)  0.4670** 
(0.1891) 
 0.4830* 
(0.2048) 
 
 Widely-owned 0.2149*** 
(0.0760) 
    
(defaultr/100) -11.8308*** 
(2.3645) 
-15.0125*** 
(2.6800) 
-18.0724*** 
(3.7633) 
-15.9818*** 
(4.0637) 
-16.8424*** 
(2.8629) 
(tier1/100)  -11.5952*** 
(2.7397) 
-10.0559*** 
(2.7705) 
-10.5769*** 
(2.8532) 
-10.6607*** 
(2.6761) 
Adjusted
2R  0.7819 0.8383 0.6185 0.5754 0.6407 
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Figure 2 – Developed the P/B ratio
 
 
To study whether the institutional and legal structure of Developed Countries has a bearing on the impact of 
pay dispersion on bank performance, we divide it into two smaller groups: a group of Civil Law countries 
and a group of Common Law countries.  We observe that the average pay dispersion of the sub-sample of 
Common Law countries is 0.5016, which is slightly higher than the average pay dispersion of the sub-
sample of Civil Law country at 0.4274 (Table 1).  
We first discuss banks from Civil Law countries.  Although the regression residuals for the indicator of 
log(profit) are not normally distributed, they are normal for the two indicators of market valuation, P/B and 
Tobin’s Q ratio, with adjusted
2R ranging from 85.35% to 90.45%, i.e.  our model is well-specified. The 
linear term and the quadratic terms of pay dispersion are only statistically significant for the two market 
valuation indicators.   The results for Tobin’s Q ratio and the P/B ratio are consistent so we only report the 
empirical results for the P/B ratio in Table 7.  Our overall results can be interpreted as supporting evidence 
of equity fairness, except for very high pay dispersion (U-shaped impact curve). We visualize the 
relationship between the variable of pay dispersion and the P/B ratio in Figure 3. The results for Tobin’s Q 
ratio and the P/B ratio are consistent and can be interpreted as supporting evidence of equity fairness, except 
for very high pay dispersion (U-shaped impact curve). Like for Developed Countries overall, very high pay 
dispersion is beneficial to bank performance in Civil Law Countries.  However, on average, pay dispersion 
group average= 
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in this group is 0.4274 and on the left-hand side of the U-shaped curve. This lends support to the equity 
fairness theory for most observed values of pay dispersion.  However, we do not obtain consistent empirical 
results with regard to the impact of the cultural variables on bank performance and valuation. 
 
Table 7 Analyses on the P/B ratio - a “group of Civil Law” – 36 banks from the Civil Law countries 
Performance indicators P/B ratio 
  Individualism Power Distance Masculinity Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
 C      
Pay dispersion -1.8034*** 
(0.5147) 
-0.9562 
(0.6827) 
-1.4941*** 
(0.4815) 
-1.6009*** 
(0.4651) 
-1.5375*** 
(0.4852) 
(Pay dispersion)
2
 
1.2663*** 
(0.4068) 
0.5452 
(0.4979) 
1.0507*** 
(0.3864) 
1.1351*** 
(0.3749) 
1.0821*** 
(0.3857) 
Cultural Index   Individualism 
 
 
0.0211** 
(0.0100) 
Power Distance 
 
 
-0.0071** 
(0.0033) 
Masculinity 
 
 
0.0114*** 
(0.0036) 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
 
-0.0081* 
(0.0047) 
 log(output)      
 log(interestp/100)      
 log(laborp)      
 log(size)  3.3468* 
(1.7057) 
   
 0.5*log(output)*log(output) 2.5187* 
(1.2754) 
4.0068** 
(1.7230) 
 2.2762* 
(1.1539) 
2.5862** 
(1.2833) 
 0.5*log(interestp/100)*log(interestp/100)      
 0.5*log(laborp)*log(laborp) 1.6115*** 
(0.4644) 
1.9941*** 
(0.6331) 
1.3937*** 
(0.4821) 
1.1839*** 
(0.4366) 
1.4758*** 
(0.4656) 
 0.5*log(size)*log(size)      
 log(output)*log(interestp/100)  -2.4415** 
(1.0949) 
   
 log(output)*log(laborp)    1.4087* 
(0.8288) 
 
 log(output)*log(size)  0.3898* 
(0.1995) 
   
 log(interestp/100)*log(laborp)      
 log(interestp/100)*log(size)  -0.3295*** 
(0.1232) 
   
 log(laborp)*log(size)  0.6182** 
(0.2813) 
 0.4602** 
(0.2077) 
 
 Widely-owned 0.1276* 
(0.0735) 
 0.2246** 
(0.0907) 
0.2583*** 
(0.0891) 
0.1829** 
(0.0826) 
(defaultr/100) -6.9496* 
(3.7985) 
-23.3533*** 
(4.5766) 
-10.1148** 
(4.1821) 
-12.9223*** 
(4.0730) 
-9.1994** 
(3.8618) 
(tier1/100)  -13.0748*** 
(3.7947) 
   
Adjusted
2R  0.8535 0.7180 0.8582 0.8711 0.8508 
 
The effect of pay dispersion on market valuation is also economically significant. As an illustrative example, 
we compute the impact of a one standard deviation change of pay dispersion from the mean on P/B for the 
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sample banks in the group of Civil Law countries.  The mean of executive pay dispersion in that group of 
banks is 0.4274 and the standard deviation is 0.2978 (See Table 1). Table 5 reports both of the linear term 
and the quadratic term of the executive pay dispersion as statistically significant for the P/B ratio, hence the 
relationship can be written as 𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥 + 𝛾𝑥2, where 𝑦 denotes P/B, 𝑥 is pay dispersion and 𝛼 and 𝛽 are 
the regression coefficients on the linear and the quadratic term. Using the empirical result without 
controlling for cultural differences, the marginal impact of a one-standard deviation increases in pay 
dispersion on P/B is calculated as  
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑥
×𝜎𝑥 = (𝛽 + 2𝛾𝑥)𝜎𝑥. Evaluated at the mean of pay dispersion 𝜇𝑥 this 
gives (-1.8034 + 2*1.2663*0.4274) * 0.2987 = -0.2147. Since the mean of the P/B ratio in this subsample is 
1.0654, the P/B change is 20.15% of the mean. Hence a one-standard deviation increases in pay dispersion 
lowers the P/B ratio by around 20%, all else equal, which is an economically significant effect.  
Figure 3 – Civil Law the P/B ratio 
 
 
Finally, the empirical results of the group of Common Law are reported in Table 8.  We obtain good values 
for adjusted
2R which range from 82.79% to 85.87%, while the residuals for all of the regressions are 
normally distributed as well. We find that the linear and quadratic terms of pay dispersion have no impact on 
the three bank performance indicators.  Based on our empirical findings, we conclude that neither the 
tournament theory nor the equity fairness theory is applicable to the relationship between executive pay 
group average  = 
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dispersion and banks’ performance in Common Law countries. None of the cultural dimensions have a 
statistically significant impact on bank performances.  We only show the empirical results for the P/B ratio 
as our bank performance indicator. 
Table 8 Analyses on the “group of Common Law” – 27 banks  
Performance indicators The P/B ratio 
  Individualism Power 
Distance 
Masculinity Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
 C   -68.8242** 
(29.7236) 
  
Pay dispersion 0.0014 
(1.2696) 
0.2336 
(1.3814) 
-0.9696 
(1.3223) 
0.1846 
(1.3519) 
 
(Pay dispersion)
2
 
-0.0084 
(1.0590) 
-0.2606 
(1.1995) 
0.8943 
(1.0984) 
-0.2264 
(1.1684) 
 
Cultural Index   Individualism 
 
 
0.0119 
(0.0174) 
Power 
Distance 
 
-0.1563 
(0.1039) 
Masculinity 
 
 
0.0064 
(0.0083) 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
 log(output)      
 log(interestp/100)      
 log(laborp)      
 log(size) 7.7824* 
(3.9412) 
 12.3375** 
(4.6754) 
  
 0.5*log(output)*log(output)      
 
0.5*log(interestp/100)*log(inter
estp/100) 
     
 0.5*log(laborp)*log(laborp)      
 0.5*log(size)*log(size) -0.5760** 
(0.2810) 
 -0.8869*** 
(0.3155) 
 -0.5534* 
(0.3171) 
 log(output)*log(interestp/100)      
 log(output)*log(laborp)      
 log(output)*log(size)      
 log(interestp/100)*log(laborp)      
 log(interestp/100)*log(size)      
 log(laborp)*log(size)      
 Widely-owned   0.6394* 
(0.3197) 
  
(defaultr/100) -9.9962*** 
(1.7676) 
-8.4548*** 
(3.0030) 
-12.8108*** 
(2.7920) 
-8.3967*** 
(2.8021) 
-9.5484*** 
(2.1907) 
(tier1/100)      
Adjusted
2R  0.8566 0.8308 0.8237 0.8299 0.8190 
 
Lastly, the empirical results for the sub-sample of Developing Country banks are reported in Table 9.  We 
find that the residual distributions of these regressions are normal for the log(profit) indicator only, 
indicating that the translog profit specification is appropriate for our sub-sample of Developing Countries.  
Furthermore, the relationship between the variable of executive pay dispersion and the log(profit) indicator 
is depicted in Figure 4. The coefficient of the quadratic term of pay dispersion is negative and significant at 
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1% level, providing supporting evidence of the equity fairness theory for our sample banks in Developing 
Countries.  Our empirical results can be interpreted as implying that greater pay dispersion has a negative 
impact on bank performance in China and India.  The average executive pay dispersion of our sub-sample of 
Developing Country banks is 0.2515 (see Table 1) and we observe that total executive compensation is 
mostly composed by salary and the cash bonus in this sub-sample. As for the cultural control variables, we 
find that the Power Distance index is negatively associated with the with the bank operation performance 
indicator, log(profit).   Similar to the results for the valuation indicators in Developed Countries, the 
Individualism index is positively associated with the bank operation performance indicator, log(profit). For 
the index of Uncertainty Avoidance, we find that it is negatively associated with operational performance, 
which is also consistent with earlier results for Developed Country valuations.  
 
Table 9 Analyses on “a group of Developing” – our banks from Developing Countries (29 banks) 
Performance indicators Log(Profit) 
 
   Individualism Power Distance Masculinity Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
C      
Pay dispersion -0.4111 
(0.2815) 
-0.2782 
(0.2288) 
0.2782 
(0.2288) 
0.2782 
(0.2288) 
0.2782 
(0.2288) 
(Pay dispersion)
2
 
-0.4992* 
(0.2819) 
-0.4301* 
(0.2295) 
-0.4301* 
(0.2295) 
-0.4301* 
(0.2295) 
-0.4301* 
(0.2295) 
Cultural Index   Individualism 
 
 
0.0133** 
(0.0059) 
Power Distance  
 
 
-0.1242** 
(0.0552) 
Masculinity 
 
 
-0.0373** 
(0.0166) 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
 
0.0373** 
(0.0166) 
 log(output)      
 log(interestp/100)      
 log(laborp)      
 log(size) 2.8143*** 
(0.6186) 
2.8547*** 
(0.5442) 
2.8547*** 
(0.5442) 
2.8547*** 
(0.5442) 
2.8547*** 
(0.5442) 
 0.5*log(output)*log(output)      
 0.5*log(interestp/100)*log(interestp/100)      
 0.5*log(laborp)*log(laborp)      
 0.5*log(size)*log(size)      
 log(output)*log(interestp/100)      
 log(output)*log(laborp)  0.6600* 
(0.3588) 
0.6600* 
(0.3588) 
0.6600* 
(0.3588) 
0.6600* 
(0.3588) 
 log(output)*log(size)      
 log(interestp/100)*log(laborp)      
 log(interestp/100)*log(size)      
 log(laborp)*log(size) 0.1774*** 
(0.0659) 
0.1867*** 
(0.0589) 
0.1867*** 
(0.0589) 
0.1867*** 
(0.0589) 
0.1867*** 
(0.0589) 
 Widely-owned      
Ceodual      
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(defaultr/100) -17.3771*** 
(4.7873) 
-18.2121*** 
(4.5979) 
-18.2121*** 
(4.5979) 
-18.2121*** 
(4.5979) 
-18.2121*** 
(4.5979) 
(tier1/100) 3.4764* 
(1.4611) 
3.6065*** 
(1.3181) 
3.6065*** 
(1.3181) 
3.6065*** 
(1.3181) 
3.6065*** 
(1.3181) 
Adjusted
2R  0.9956 0.9960 0.9960 0.9960 0.9960 
 
Figure 4 - Developing Profit 
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We summarize all of our empirical results in the Table below.   
Table 10 Summary of empirical results  
Performance 
indicators 
Log(Profit)  Tobin Q The P/B ratio 
Developed 
Countries 
(63 banks) 
Neither* Equity fairness theory; except for 
very high pay dispersion, the 
tournament theory holds (U-shaped 
impact curve) 
 
Individualism: positive + 
Power distance:  not significant 
Masculinity: not significant 
Uncertainty Avoidance: Negative – 
Equity fairness theory; except for 
very high pay dispersion, the 
tournament theory holds (U-shaped 
impact curve) 
 
Individualism: positive + 
Power distance:  Negative - 
Masculinity: positive + 
Uncertainty Avoidance: Negative – 
Civil Law  
(36 banks) 
Neither* Equity fairness theory; except for 
very high pay dispersion, the 
tournament theory holds (U-shaped 
impact curve) 
 
Individualism: not significant 
Power distance:  not significant 
Masculinity: not significant 
Uncertainty Avoidance: not 
significant – 
Equity fairness theory; except for 
very high pay dispersion, the 
tournament theory holds (U-shaped 
impact curve) 
 
Individualism: positive + 
Power distance:  Negative - 
Masculinity: positive + 
Uncertainty Avoidance: Negative – 
Common Law 
(27 banks) 
Neither Neither Neither 
Developing 
Countries 
(29 banks) 
Equity fairness theory 
 
Individualism: positive + 
Power distance:  Negative – 
Masculinity: Negative – 
Uncertainty Avoidance: positive + 
Neither* Neither* 
 * Residuals of regression non-normal 
 
5. Conclusion 
The issue of pay dispersion has not received much attention in the banking literature. The main contribution 
of our study is to fill this gap using a study with global scope.  In particular, we look at pay dispersion at the 
top executive level and test whether the tournament theory or the equity fairness theory is applicable to bank 
performance.  Policymakers care about the design of executive pay at banks because the systemic 
importance of banks and the use of taxpayer money to rescue failing financial institutions.  One contribution 
of the paper is to incorporate the notion that cultural factors may have an impact on how pay dispersion 
26 
 
influences firm performance and valuation.  By controlling for cultural differences across countries, our 
overall conclusion is that teamwork (arguing for smaller pay dispersion) is favored over tournament in most 
groups of our sample.  Lower pay dispersion is mostly effective in enhancing bank performance in a 
significant section of sample banks, i.e. Civil Law and Developing countries, China, and India.  With regard 
to the cultural variables, we find that two of the four cultural dimensions have a significant impact on the 
valuation indicators for our sample banks in Developed Countries.  Individualism is positively associated 
with market valuation such as the indicators of P/B and Tobin’s Q while Uncertainty Avoidance has a 
negative relationship.   
The level and the equity of pay have not been the focus of growth strategies in international business. After 
the global financial crisis, policymakers and shareholders have started paying more attention to the impact of 
executive pay structure for growth and stability. Our paper provides supporting evidence of the need for 
lower executive pay dispersion in the banking industry given its overall positive implications on corporate 
performance in Civil Law countries and Developing countries, China and India.  
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Appendix A 
 Table A1.  Common Law vs Civil Law countries 
Common Law  There are 27 banks in our sample belong to this category and these banks are from 
o Ireland 
o USA 
o Australia 
o UK 
o Canada 
Civil Law There are 36 banks in our sample belong to this category and these banks are from 
o Belgium 
o Spain 
o Portugal 
o Netherlands 
o Switzerland 
o Denmark 
o Norway 
o Austria 
o Sweden 
o Finland 
o Italy 
o Germany 
o France 
 
